

Critically assess the proposition that democracies do not go to war with each other.

1. Introduction

Ultimately, the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere. Democracies don't attack each other; they make better trading partners and partners in diplomacy.¹

In the international realm research has also shown the near absence of war between democracies that supports the notion of *democratic peace*. The democratic countries seem to enjoy a permanent peace among themselves challenges the widely held view that nation-states are doomed to exist in a state of war.²

Many scholars and leaders of democratic countries say that “democracies do not go to war each other”. This proposition, what is called “democratic peace”, is considerably controversial in the theory and practice of international relations. The number of democratic countries has been dramatically increased during the 20th century. Although only 10 countries were democratic in the spring of 1917, when the United States entered into the World War I, now there are more than 120 emerging and established democracies.³ Political situation surrounding democracies and the nature of the democracies have also been changing accordingly.

This essay aims to clarify the points of argument of democratic peace theory, to introduce the rebuttal from the theoretical opponents, and to find out the possibilities of the future of the democratic peace theory.

The discussion begins with the definitions of the key terms related to the discussion of democratic peace which might be vague and differ from discussants. This is followed by the analysis of wars by democracies. The realists' antitheses are to be introduced by looking at the (1) theoretical concepts and the examples by the period: (2) before the World War II, (3) after the World War II. The fourth section deals with the refutations by the liberal internationalists. The fifth section assesses the proposition that democracies do not go to war with each other and examines whether the reasons by the supporters of democratic peace are justified or not. The final section discusses the validity and possibilities of the future of the democratic peace theory by looking at the situation of the democratic countries today.

2. Definitions and brief explanations of vague terms

(1) Democracy

As democracy is typified by the Lincoln's address at Gettysburg—"the government of the people, by the people, for the people,"⁴ democratic governments are controlled by people, or citizens. Although the word democracy stands for *demos* (the people) and *kratos* (rule) in Greek⁵ and the concept has been existing for more than 2500 years, its characteristic has been changing dramatically, especially for the last one hundred years. And "there is no consensus at all among peace researchers about what constitutes democracy".⁶ So when discussing democratic peace theory, the definition should be carefully examined. What we consider democracy today is representative democracy, and every adult citizen has a right to vote and the government is created by free election. The political system is featured "by the rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protection of speech, assembly, religion, and property."⁷ The government should be politically stable at least three years, and control military and foreign affairs.⁸ This kind of mature democracy did not exist before the nineteenth century. Democracies mean liberal democracies featured by the above characteristics. This essay examines the applicability of the proposition of democratic peace to the democracies today, and thus it only discusses the democracy in twentieth century.

(2) War

In the disputes concerning democratic peace theory, the definition of war is also problematic. Russett et al. defined the war in their theory as "large-scale institutionally organized lethal violence" with more than "one thousand battle fatalities." This definition excludes undercover operation by government (e.g. support of violent actors) and war in this context means only "interstate" war, that is, the war between internationally recognized sovereign states.⁹ In other words, democratic peace theory considers only conventional warfare. It does not consider low-intensity warfare, or all forms of international terrorism or guerrilla activities.

Theoretical opponents criticise the exclusive definition of war by the democratic peace theorists and the excuse of the exceptions to the proposition that democracies do not fight with each other. Concerning the former criticism, the opponents often take the example of the American Civil War because in the one of the brutalized conflicts in history both sides were democracies and they fought for their identity. Some even call the war "the war between the states." However, because the condition of democracies at that time is quite different from democracies today, this

essay is not going to discuss the war before nineteenth century. Concerning the latter, this essay raises the examples of disputes and examine well later because those exceptions can be crucial to the theory.

In this essay, thus, war means “interstate” war with the condition that democratic peace proponents defined.

(3) Democratic peace

For the last twenty years since Rummel argued in 1983 that “libertarian states were more peaceful and that libertarian states never fought each other,”¹⁰ democratic peace has been one of the most spirited debates among scholars of international relations. The original advocacy of the democratic peace traced back to *Perpetual Peace* authored by Immanuel Kant. He proposed a structural mechanism that democracies restrain themselves from fighting with each other because of the imposition they have at war. This hypothesis, he added, can only be applied to the relations between democracies; however it is not applicable to the relations between democracy and non-democracy. He explained this hypothesis by two reasons—moral and economic.¹¹ The moral reason is on the basis of what he called a “pacific union”, a zone of peace with shared moral awareness of democracies. Taking peaceful behaviour to solve conflicts is regarded as preferable to appealing to violence in a “pacific union” internationally as well as domestically, because of the common moral foundation they have with each other. The transparency of democracies, that is freedom of expression and communication, helps to understand mutually. The economical reason is on the basis of the development of economic interdependence. The pursuit of mutual profits strengthens the bond of the pacific union. Democracies will lead to peace because of “their culture of peaceful conflict resolution,” their “common moral values” which forms a pacific union, and their “economic cooperation and interdependence” which strengthen the pacific union.¹²

Historically, “the strong norm that democracy should not fight each other seems to have developed only toward the end of the nineteenth century.”¹³ Woodrow Wilson expressed the similar vision as Kant’s idea in his Fourteen Points, although at that time there were few democracies and they are not situated near with each other. By the 1970s, the number of democracies increased and they were situated geographically near. “There was little war, or serious threats of war, to be found in relationships between democracies.”¹⁴ The phenomenon of democratic peace, though, seems to be only applicable to the matured democracies in industrialized countries.¹⁵

Bruce Russett theoretically explained the reasons that democracies prevent

fighting with each other from the normative-cultural and institutional-structural points of view.¹⁶ They are peace-loving among democracies, but not always unaggressive to non-democracies. The normative-cultural explanation suggests that armed conflicts between democracies are rare because they believe that conflicts can be resolved by peaceful norms such as compromise and non-violence; on the contrary, armed conflicts between non-democracies frequently occur because they use, or they assume their opponents use, violence and the threat of violence to solve disputes. And as democratic norms are easily terrorized by non-democratic norms, democracies apply non-democratic norms to disentangle warfare. The institutional-structural explanation proposes the difficulty of democracies to obtain legitimacy when leaders of democracies try to make decisions which may give citizens a risk. It takes time and it is very difficult for leaders in democracies to make a decision to engage their country into warfare, because they are institutionally and structurally constrained by constitutional checks and balances, division of powers, and the necessity to persuade the people by explaining costs, benefits and risks of war; on the contrary, leaders of non-democracies are not as restrained as leaders of democracies and they tend to move into war more easily.

It is notable that in both explanations democracies are not described as peaceful in all the relations they have. Democracies do not go to war each other, but do fight with non-democracies to protect their values and democracy itself. War decision is affected by the regime type of the adversary and democracies can be war-prone when facing non-democracies. “Hostility toward non-democracies is more likely because it is easier to convince the people to take military actions because non-democratic governments might be more aggressive and less constrained by their institution or structure.”¹⁷ On the other hand, democracies tend to expect other democracies to act according to the peaceful norms and structural constraints.

3. Wars between democracies: Realists’ antitheses to democratic peace

Realists examine the democratic peace both theoretically and empirically. In this section, firstly (1) the theoretical antitheses are introduced by describing realist outlook of the definition and the explanation of the democratic peace theory. Secondly, the empirical antitheses are introduced by describing wars in the twentieth century. The second part of this section is divided into two parts: (2) wars before and during the World War II and (3) wars after the World War II. Examples raised here are the wars during twentieth century, that is, the wars after the “mature democracy” emerged.

(1) Theoretical antitheses

The theoretical opponents accuse democratic peace theorists of variant definitions in their theory, as Spiro stated that the proponents “selectively adopt definitions of key variables so that data analysis yields the results they seek.”¹⁸ Their limitation of the definition of war to inter-state war ignores the domestic wars at all. And within the limitation, the democratic peace theorists try to produce peace by modifying the definition and finding exceptions on a case-by-case basis.

Layne, who called the democratic peace theory a myth, argued that the theory is “based on hope, or not on fact”¹⁹ He tested four cases of crises that democracies almost went to war and conclude that the avoidance of conflicts was explained by realism, rather than the mutual expectation of democratic norms and culture between democracies. He also denies the institutional constraints. If the policymakers of the democracies were affected by public opinion and policy makers and citizens really mind the human and material costs of war, “democracies would be peaceful in their relations with all states, whether democratic or not.”²⁰

Farber and Gowa concludes that neither the cultural-normative or institutive-structural explanations of democratic peace theory is completely persuasive, because there is no evidence that norms can not be distinguished from interests and the there is no reason on structural constraints that democracies are peace-prone to democracies but war-prone to non-democracies.²¹ Stable peace can not last among democracies because democracies are unexceptionally forced to enter a state of war or military deterrence by the structure of international anarchy system and their eternal security dilemma.²² Democratic peace sounds attractive and impressive, but “it fails to establish a causal link.” The theory provides only small amount of empirical support and “several important cases of wars between democratic states are not counted for reasons that are not counted.”²³

Lastly, other factors were suggested by the opponents to account for the lack of wars:²⁴ War can be prevented by geographic distance, industrialization, economical development, trade, alliances and other reasons.

(2) Empirical antitheses 1-- Before and during the World War II

Wilhelmine Germany in the World War I:

Wilhelmine Germany's entry into the World War I against democracies is the only but the most important example to invalidate democratic peace theory. Wilhelmine Germany, which started late as an imperialism, decided to go to the war to redivide

colonies. As Doyle confessed that “Imperial German is a difficult case,”²⁵ it is very difficult to define Wilhelmine Germany as non-democracy. The councillors were not just “elected by universal male suffrage” but also “the state ruled under the law, respecting civil equality and the rights of its citizens.”²⁶ He made a desperate excuse that Germany was democracy in their domestic politics but not in their foreign policy.²⁷ Imperial Germany tends to be incorrectly coloured by the image of the experience of 1933-45.²⁸

Finland in the World War II:

From 1941 to 1944 liberal democratic Finland joined the fascist alliance to avoid military takeover by the Soviet Union. Although Finland had actually no record of fatal fight with liberal regimes during the World War II²⁹ and the decisions of Finland came from the idea that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” the fact is that Finland joined the opposing group and was at war with other liberal democracies and that Great Britain dropped at least one bomb.³⁰

(3) Empirical antitheses 2-- After the World War II

The impact of international violence changed drastically after the World War II. There has been no massive fight or genocide between democracies since the World War and statistical analysis also shows that there is no significance relations between democratic-democratic dyads and war “only during World War I and after 1945.”³¹ However, there are some doubtful examples of crises that democracies almost went to war each other.

In 1967, Israel attacked the United States Ship Liberty. Rummel excludes this example because “Israel was only partially free due to its mixed capitalist-socialist economy.”³² Also in 1967, Lebanon involved in the Six Day War, though Russett explained that Lebanon took part in the war by a few combat planes and nobody was injured by Lebanon.³³

The claims of the exceptions of democratic peace theory might make the theory itself unreliable, because this fact shows the possibility to define democracy and democratic peace differently for different researchers.

Spiro challenged the theory statistically and indicated that the number of wars between democracies were explained by “random chance” and cited Mearsheimer’s prospects that “democracies have been few in number over the past two centuries, and thus there have not been many cases where two democracies were in a position to fight each other.”³⁴

4. Democratic Peace: Liberal internationalists' refutation to the antitheses

As stated in antitheses, proponents tried to account for the validity of democratic peace theory by applying the theory to each case. All the claims given are margins of liberal democracies and they are explained by the maturity of democracy. These exceptions would not undermine the proposition that mature or well established democracies do not go to war one another. According to Rummel, all of the mature democracies (or, as he called it, undoubted or well-established democracies) include such nations as the United states, most of European countries, Japan, South Korea and the like, and have in common several criteria: "their citizens regardless of class have equal rights; policies and leaders are determined through open and competitive elections and voting; and there is freedom of speech." And to be accepted by other democracies as democracy and to settle its democratic culture, more than three years need to have passed since its commencement of liberal democracy.³⁵

In the book *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, Russett commented to the alternative explanations to the factors of lack of wars in democracies.³⁶ Firstly, the factor of geographical distance cannot explain the present situation. Democratic states were few and far between in the world before the World War II and distance might be plausible at that time. However, in the contemporary world there are many proximate countries, for instance, in Europe and geographical distance does not seem conclusive. Secondly, the factors of political stability, economical development, industrialization and trade look more plausible. For the politically stable and economically developed countries, the benefits seem not to compensate the cost of wartime deconstruction. Investment and political and economical negotiations seem to be much more important and profitable. Trade is promoted by transnational and international institutions and consequently promotes peaceful relationships within these kinds of institutions. Of course, those institutions do not exclude non-democratic countries and there are so many examples of international institutions which includes both democratic and non-democratic states. Democracies are open to international linkage, although autocracies rarely are. So it is quite difficult to separate these factors from democracies. Lastly, the factor of alliances does not also explain the lack of war. There is an analysis that "allied states are more likely to fight each other when both states are militarized."³⁷ But democratic allies "are not likely to have violent conflicts with each other."³⁸ Alliances are usually formed because of their common interests, often their common enemies. And the reason for democratic countries to ally is that they have "a desire to preserve their common democratic institutions."³⁹ If this is true, then peace among

democracies is accounted for by democracies, not alliances.

Some empirical antitheses were refuted by Russett. First, He disputed that Layne's idea that Imperial German had been a democracy was unreliable, because "crucial foreign policy decisions were taken without consulting Parliament" even in France and Britain, as well as Imperial Germany. He also pointed out that even Spiro rejected Layne's idea about Imperial Germany.⁴⁰ There was no chances of war between democracies and thus democratic peace theory need not be discussed here. Second, he admitted that democracies had declared war on a democratic country in the case of Finland during the World War II. He gave an evasive reply to this matter that there were no combat casualty between Finland and other democracies. This "war" should be excluded by the definition "used by the Correlates of War Project from which Spiro and I (Russett) drew our data."⁴¹ Moreover, he applied Spiro's method of year-by-year analysis on wars on democracies to use of force and all other disputes between 1946 and 1986 (41 years) and obtained the result that in most of the years in this period (32 out of 41 years in use of force, 34 out of 41years in any dispute) the number of disputes with or without use of force between democratic dyads were significantly less than the numer of ones between non-democratic dyads. He is even "grateful for the challenge" of the Spiro because the result of the application of the challenge to the democratic peace theory made the evidence of the theory stronger.⁴² Risse concluded that theoretical antitheses miss the mark and that "the challenge to the 'democratic peace' proposition rests on rather dubious assumptions and equally doubtful empirical analysis."⁴³

5. Assessment and examination

This essay only discussed the wars in twentieth century because the author adopted the idea that "in 1900 not a single country had what we would today consider a democracy: a government created by elections in which every adult citizen could vote."⁴⁴ The situation surrounding democracies and the nature of the democracies have changed especially after women received suffrage and slavery was abolished. Nature of wars also changed drastically after the invention of the nuclear bomb and other related technology. Considering these situations, it seems effective to examine the correlation between wars and democracies after World War II. But simultaneously the scholars have to bear in mind that the history of the democratic peace is extremely short. It goes without saying that Rummel's first research was "only for a very limited time period."⁴⁵

The proposition that democracies do not fight with each other is plausible

according to the discussion between scholars. Although there are some claims about the definition of the significant terms, democratic peace theory seems to be theoretically, statistically and empirically justified, and as Macmillan stated, “supporters and critics alike have, virtually without exception, agreed.”⁴⁶ The theoretical basement of democratic peace theory is *Perpetual Peace* authored by Immanuel Kant, but we must never forget that the proposition is only true in the very limited range defined by the theoretical proponents.

Exceptions, like Finland’s example of joining opposite alliance, of the democratic peace theory should be carefully examined because they would clearly show the ambiguous border line of democracies and the possible prospects in the future. Russett raised the examples of Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus and India-Pakistan fight over Kashmir, and explained that “long-term rival states, with many conflicts of interest between them, have gone to war or had substantial fatal clashes only when one or both of them was not governed democratically.”⁴⁷ The study of exceptions and degree (or maturity) of democracies will help to find out the dangerousness and future outlook of democratic peace.

Some dangerous possibilities should be pointed out. Firstly, all the leaders of democracies do not always make decisions with liberal democratic ways. New democracies, especially in its early stage, can be more illiberal and war may look more attractive to fulfil their expectations. Secondly, a democratic state has to be regarded as a democracy by other democracies. That the citizens are enlightened and the state has liberal democratic institutions is necessary but not sufficient for the state to belong to the democratic peace.⁴⁸ This means that if perception changes, then a state may be excluded from democratic peace. Lastly, even though there is ‘democratic peace’ within democracies, democracies can be war-prone when facing non-democracies. To spread ‘democratic peace’ and to keep peacefulness of their own territory, democracies might democratize other regimes and liberal conscience would justify wars toward non-democracies as moral.⁴⁹ The situation that “to be safe democracy must kill its enemy when it can and where it can”⁵⁰ may happen, as Elihu Root said during World War I. Great power could utilize this theory and go to war in order to justify promotion of their interests or deflect people’s eye from domestic problems.

Democratic peace theory is a ‘hope’. There are some exceptions and dangerous possibilities in the theory, but it is true that peace is, or is believed to be, guaranteed even in limited territory. The belief and perception that democracies, unlike dictatorship, do not go to war with each other and can offer non-violent way to resolve conflicts is important because it strengthen normative constraints between democracies. “That

democratic countries seem to enjoy a permanent peace among themselves challenges the widely held view that nation-states are doomed to exist in a state of war.”⁵¹

6. The possibilities of the democratic peace in the future

(1) Democracy today (Redefinition)

This essay has been discussing the validity and possibilities of democratic peace in the twentieth century. So the definition of democracy today should be the same as defined at the second section [2-(1)], but some points should be added here. What else is necessary for democracy to make the ‘hope’ to be realised? In democracy, every adult citizen, including every woman, has a right to vote and the government is created by free election. The political system is governed by the rule of law, powers are separated adequately, and freedom of speech, assembly and religion should be protected. The individual freedom is quite important. Citizens have freedom to express what they think, and if they are able to oppose and resist war, militarism and mobilization of war, and their action can develop to a peace movement. Institutional-structural constraints will be more effective by peace movements.

(2) Peace movement

Peace movements have been developed in the western and northern countries.⁵² Of course, they have been organized not only in democracies, but also in non-democracies. But the movements have been “repressed and severely harassed—leaders jailed, even killed”⁵³ because of its characteristic: the aim of the movements can often be anti-political. Peace movements tend to be oppressed in non-democracies which are often short of social alternatives and pressure-group concepts of politics.⁵⁴ Peace movements are more developed in democracies than in other regimes.

A peace movement in a country is open to other countries because peace can not usually be realised in one country. The movement is easily expanded internationally and, if it becomes more significant, the related states may be influenced: they will find the same culture and norms in other country which the same movement occurs. Peace movements will, thus, increase not only institutional-cultural but also cultural-normative constraints. Democratic peace theory will be strengthened by such movements and it can be a real situation, not just a hope.

7. Conclusion

The proposition that democracies do not go to war with each other has been widely discussed by scholars. It has been tested theoretically, empirically and statistically by opponents, mainly realists, criticised their vague definitions of war and democracy, and proponents have tried to explain the exceptions of wars between democracies.

Looking at the wars in the twentieth century, the proposition seems to be agreed by both theoretical opponents and proponents. The proposition, or the democratic peace theory, does not mean the peace all over the world, but means the peace within the very small area where the limited definition is applicable.

To extend the possibilities, one of the characteristic of democracies, a freedom of activity, can be a key point. The internationality of peace movements may promote the democratic peace phenomenon by increasing institutional-cultural and cultural-normative constraints of the decision makers. Those movements enable to make democratic peace close to world peace.

Endnotes

1. Bill Clinton, State of the Union address, 1994
2. United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Reports 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World*, Oxford University Press, 2002, Ch.4, p.85
3. Dobriansky, Paula, *on Community of Democracies Meeting*, <http://usembassy.state.gov/tokyo/wwwhglo20021115a3.html>
4. Abraham Lincoln, *The Gettysburg Address*, 1863
5. Crick, Bernard, '*Democracy: A Very Short Introduction*' (Oxford University Press, 2002), p.1
6. Cohen, Raymond, 'Pacific Unions: a reappraisal of the theory that "democracies do not go to war with each other"', *Review of International Studies*, Vol.20 (1994), p.211
7. Zakaria, Fareed, '*The future of freedom: illiberal democracy at home and abroad*' (Norton, 2003), p.17
8. Nils Petter Gleditsch, Focus on: Democracy and Peace, p.370
9. Russett, Bruce, 'Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World' (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), p.12
10. Spiro, David E., 'The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace', *International Security*, vol.19, No.2 (Fall 1994), p.50
11. Sorensen, Georg, '*Democracy and Democratization: Processes and Prospects in a Changing World*', second edition (Westview Press, 1998), Ch.4, pp.95-97
12. Ibid
13. Russett, Bruce, 'Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World' (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), p.5
14. Ibid, p.10
15. Sorensen, Georg, '*Democracy and Democratization: Processes and Prospects in a Changing World*', second edition (Westview Press, 1998), Ch.4, p.106
16. Russett, Bruce, 'Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World' (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp.30-42
17. Doyle, Michael M. 1986: 1161; Owen, John M. 1995:96
18. Spiro, David E., 'The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace', *International Security*, vol.19, No.2 (Fall 1994), p.55
19. Layne, Christopher, 'Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace', *International Security*, vol.19, No.2 (Fall 1994), p.49
20. Ibid, p.21

21. Farber, Henry S. and Gowa, Joanne, 'Politics and Peace' in: *'Debating the Democratic Peace'* (London: The MIT Press), pp.241-244
22. Wartz(1979), Mearsheimer(1990), in: Russett, Bruce, 'Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Clod War World' (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), p.24
23. Layne, Christopher, 'Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace', *International Security*, vol.19, No.2 (Fall 1994), pp.48-49
24. Rummel, Rudolph J., *Freedom, Democracy, Peace; Power, Democide, and War*, <http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/> (Accessed, 25 October, 2003)
25. Doyle, Michael W., 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs' in: *'Debating the Democratic Peace'* (London: The MIT Press), p.13
26. Ibid
27. Layne, Christopher, 'Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace', *International Security*, vol.19, No.2 (Fall 1994), pp.41-42
28. Owen, John M., 'How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace', *International Security*, vol.19, No.2 (Fall 1994), p.272
29. 'Correspondence', *International Security*, Vol.19, No.4 (Spring 1995), p.168
30. Spiro, David E., 'The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace', *International Security*, vol.19, No.2 (Fall 1994), pp..61-62
31. Farber, Henry S. and Gowa, Joanne, 'Politics and Peace' in: *'Debating the Democratic Peace'* (London: The MIT Press), p.257
32. Spiro, David E., 'The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace', *International Security*, vol.19, No.2 (Fall 1994), p.60
33. Russett, Bruce, 'Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Clod War World' (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), p.18
34. Spiro, David E., 'The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace', *International Security*, vol.19, No.2 (Fall 1994), pp.76-81
35. Rummel, Rudolph J., *Freedom, Democracy, Peace; Power, Democide, and War*, <http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/> (Accessed, 25 October, 2003)
36. Russett, Bruce, 'Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Clod War World' (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp..25-30
37. Bremer(1992), in: Russett, Bruce, 'Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Clod War World' (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), p27
38. Siverson and Emmons(1991) in: Russett, Bruce, 'Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Clod War World' (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), p.27

- 39 Russett, Bruce, 'Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World' (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), p.27
40. 'Correspondence', *International Security*, Vol.19, No.4 (Spring 1995), p.168
41. Ibid
42. Ibid, p.175
43. Risse, Thomas, 'Democratic Peace – Warlike Democracies?: A Social Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Argument', in: Gustaaf Geeraerts (ed.), *Democratic Peace for Europe: Myth or Reality* (VUB Press, 1998), p.22
44. Zakaria, Fareed, '*The future of freedom: illiberal democracy at home and abroad*', (Norton, 2003), p.13
45. Spiro, David E., 'The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace', *International Security*, vol.19, No.2 (Fall 1994), p.77
46. Macmillan, John, 'Democracies don't fight: a case of the wrong research agenda?', *Review of International Studies*, Vol.22, No.3 (1996), pp.275
47. Russett, Bruce, 'Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World' (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), p.20
48. Owen, John M., 'How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace', *International Security*, vol.19, No.2 (Fall 1994), p.96
49. Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, 2nd ed. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1986) in Spiro 81
50. Layne, Christopher, 'Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace', *International Security*, vol.19, No.2 (Fall 1994), p.48
51. United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Reports 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World*, Oxford University Press, 2002, Ch.4, p.85
52. Young, Nigel, 'Peace Movement in History', in: Barash David P. (ed.), '*Approaches to Peace: A Reader in Peace Studies*', (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.228
53. Ibid, p.235
54. Ibid, p.236

Bibliography

Crick, Bernard, '*Democracy: A Very Short Introduction*' (Oxford University Press, 2002), Ch.1

Cohen, Raymond, 'Pacific Unions: a reappraisal of the theory that "democracies do not go to war with each other"', *Review of International Studies*, Vol.20 (1994), pp.207-223

De Vree, Johan K., 'On some Common Misunderstandings about Democracy', in: Gustaaf Geeraerts (ed.), *Democratic Peace for Europe: Myth or Reality* (VUB Press, 1998), pp.41-59

Doyle, Michael W., 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs' in: '*Debating the Democratic Peace*' (London: The MIT Press)

Farber, Henry S. and Gowa, Joanne, 'Polities and Peace' in: '*Debating the Democratic Peace*' (London: The MIT Press)

Gleditsch, Nils Petter, 'Democracy and Peace', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.29, No.4, 1992 pp.369-376

Layne, Christopher, 'Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace', *International Security*, vol.19, No.2 (Fall 1994), pp.5-49

Macmillan, John, 'Democracies don't fight: a case of the wrong research agenda?', *Review of International Studies*, Vol.22, No.3 (1996), pp.275-299

Macmillan, John, 'Beyond the Separate Democratic Peace', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.40, No.2, 2003, pp.233-243

Owen, John M., 'How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace', *International Security*, vol.19, No.2 (Fall 1994), pp.87-125

United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Reports 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World*, Oxford University Press, 2002, Ch.4

Risse, Thomas, 'Democratic Peace – Warlike Democracies?: A Social Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Argument', in: Gustaaf Geeraerts (ed.), *Democratic Peace for Europe: Myth or Reality* (VUB Press, 1998), pp.19-39

Rummel, Rudolph J., *Freedom, Democracy, Peace; Power, Democide, and War*, <http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/> (Accessed, 25 October, 2003)

Russett, Bruce, 'Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World' (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993)

Spiro, David E., 'The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace', *International Security*, vol.19, No.2 (Fall 1994), pp.50-86

Sorensen, Georg, *Democracy and Democratization: Processes and Prospects in a Changing World*, second edition, Westview Press, 1998, Ch.4

Young, Nigel, 'Peace Movement in History', in: Barash David P. (ed.), *Approaches to Peace: A Reader in Peace Studies*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp.228-237

Zakaria, Fareed, *The future of freedom: illiberal democracy at home and abroad*, (Norton, 2003)

'Correspondence', *International Security*, Vol.19, No.4 (Spring 1995), pp.164-188